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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

1. MEMO REPORT

9 May 1961

Refile - 1230-1245

action requested by FLEMING.

1. Tape on FRIESEN/CLEMENS Conversation - FLEMING called and requested a tape in order to request the original tape of a conversation in the last batch of intercepts between CLEMENS and FRIESEN. The following point came up on tape, alias unknown, whose UPHILL crypto in the BAVISION investigation is "Tiker".

A. FLEMING said it was his personal belief that it was even more likely that CLEMENS was a Soviet agent than FRIESEN, and FLEMING had very few doubts about CLEMENS' guilt.

B. One of the main points against CLEMENS is that in the early 50's he recruited a number of his former friends in Dresden for UPHILL, and there are clear indications that most of them were Soviet agents before they were recruited, and FLEMING recommended their recruitment under instructions from the East. FLEMING said two of the cases in particular were very bad and that it seemed most unlikely that CLEMENS could be acting in good faith at the time he recruited the agents.

C. FLEMING said he wanted to request telephone coverage on CLEMENS also and said he presumed we would have no difficulty getting coverage in Frankfurt. FLEMING said we would not have any problem. FLEMING said before putting on the tape he wanted to talk to CLEMENS' Dienststelle Leiter in order to alert him to the fact that there were grave doubts about CLEMENS' security, to ask him to keep a close eye on CLEMENS, and also to alert him to the fact that CLEMENS' telephone was likely to be tapped. FLEMING said with a smile that he also would suggest that the Dienststelle Leiter keep operational conversations with CLEMENS to a minimum since the Americans would be reading everything with interest. FLEMING also mentioned that although the telephone security was bad enough with UPHILL Headquarters types, he feared it was far worse with the operators in the field.

D. In connection with CLEMENS and FRIESEN, FLEMING noted that in the course of the present investigation UPHILL was picking up increasing indications that someone he ever connected with the "Abwehr Leitstelle" in Dresden had to be checked very closely. FLEMING said he was convinced that there was a clique of UPHILLers from this Abwehrstelle and it was entirely possible that they all were all bad apples or soon would turn out to be so. FLEMING concluded by saying that if things were going in terms of the ever expanding circle of suspects, he would end up with the quota of staffers decimated if the investigation were brought to its logical and successful conclusion.

CD D - E414A - 551dF, 12 June 61

E. HOFMANN and SHOFMAN - BERNHARDT said he had not had a chance to talk to UPHILL to see if CALLIKAN coverage would be requested in Cologne. BERNHARDT said that in view of the apparent difficulties involved, he was inclined to think UPHILL would not consider the coverage worth the risks involved.

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Att to WFO 55128, 15 Jun 1961

3. CLEMENS - [] asked for more details on the suspicious cases [] had run mentioned by FLEMING at the previous meeting. FLEMING went into detail on one case as follows:

*before
SICK*
A. In circa '50/51 CLEMENS recommended the recruitment of one of his old pals in Dresden who was the business manager for the Dresden Philharmonic Orchestra. FLEMING said that at the time CLEMENS recommended and carried out the recruitment of his friend, he concealed the fact that his friend had a very murky SD background.

B. CLEMENS initially recruited his friend on the basis that he somehow could be built up into a CE case, for reasons that were very obscure. His friend had not been on the payroll long before CLEMENS said that the CE prospects were not very bright and suggested that the thing to do was transform his friend into a reporting source. In making this suggestion CLEMENS claimed his friend earlier had had some sort of radio training and could quickly be trained as a radio operator.

C. Not too long after this the friend and the Philharmonic Orchestra made a trip to the West, during the course of which CLEMENS' friend was given intensive WT training (it turned out he had never had any previous radio experience), including cryptography, etc. The friend was subsequently equipped with a WI set and actually went on the air a few times, but then the case collapsed rather mysteriously although the friend did not appear to have gotten into any trouble.

D. FLEMING ended up by saying that in the course of checking this case out there were clear indications that CLEMENS' friend had been a Soviet agent before he had been recommended for recruitment by CLEMENS. FLEMING said further it appeared very probable that the only purpose of the operation had been to provide the Soviets with an indication of UPHILL's capabilities in this type of operation, including training, communications equipment, signal plans, etc.

Att. D. EGMA - 55128, 12 June 1961

4. CAVATA Coverage on HOFMANN and CLEMENS - [] passed along the last reservations contained in BORN 1107 concerning telephone coverage on CLEMENS. BERNHARDT said he thought the points made sense. After some discussion, BERNHARDT said as far as he was concerned there really was no objection if we gave the British a fairly straight story and indicated that we were helping UPHILL out on a security investigation of CLEMENS and possibly KUDRO-SY; since the British presumably would figure this out in any event, they could not accuse KURAK of having advised them about the real purpose of the exercises. BERNHARDT said it appeared that the real question now appeared to be whether or not the value of the CAVATAH coverage would be enough to justify the complications involved in playing things straight with the British. He said he would think things over and have some decision by the next meeting. [] touched on the possibility of UPHILL discussing matters directly with the British. BERNHARDT's response was coldly unenthusiastic and it was clear that he preferred that KURAK front for UPHILL - presumably because it is not interested in discussing staff security problems with the British. [] where things stood on UPHILL's taking action through British or through CAVATAH to get coverage on HOFMANN, BERNHARDT said he doubted anything would be done by UPHILL - certainly nothing that would involve CAVATAH. BERNHARDT said he was convinced that no matter what caveats UPHILL used with CAVATAH in discussing the possibility of coverage, it would not be possible for CAVATAH to hold the information as closely as UPHILL would like. BERNHARDT said UPHILL has had a number of bad past experiences in discussing sensitive cases with CAVATAH, requesting that the information be kept tightly held, and discovering shortly thereafter that most of the old [] in the CAVATAH hierarchy including KUHLAU, etc., had been cut in.